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Abstract. This article highlights the difficulties inherent to informing security policy with history.
During the policy process--or more accurately, policy processes characterized by and ascribed to
nonlinear, chaotic phenomena that are linked largely through illusory correlation to acts deemed to be
policy--respect, tribute, and even oppositional aphorisms often are raised to history. So the story goes,
there are lessons from history that must be learned. Those who do not learn from history are doomed to
repeat it. On the other hand, history is the past not the present nor future. No two situations are alike,
so those who think they learn from history are not doomed to repeat it, but merely doomed.
Three are even more pragmatic concerns. Is history a sequence of events in series and/or in parallel? Is
history a continuous, onrushing welter that can only be sampled? Does history have any meaning at all
independent of necessarily skewed perceptual and interpretive strategies. And even if history can be
validly conceived of as manageable and meaningful, how does one know what aspects are germane to
the present and future--e.g., to policy development, implementation, and evaluation?
That all the above concerns have concrete as well as abstract consequences can be illustrated by
considering the current policy deliberations concerning the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO)
bombing of Yugoslavian military assets in Montenegro and Serbia. Supporters of the evolving policy
point out that Milosevic has "backed down" in the face of military force before and, therefore, he'll back
down now. These supporters conveniently do not point out that the "backing down" has occurred so
that his overall political position has been bettered. Is this really backing down or merely an example of
an anchoring technique wherein aggression is escalated and then reduced to a level above the preescalation level that seems to be a retreat only via the most recent psychophysical and social
comparison processes?
Opponents of the evolving policy point out that it's eerily similar to United States (U.S.) policy leading up
to and during the Vietnam War that ended in 1975 with a US defeat. Specifically, the opponents cite a
civil war involving atrocities on both sides, although much more on one than the other; one side having
a strong, authoritarian ruler, the other, a more amorphous, shifting, and less adept leadership,
seemingly doomed to failure without Western aid; and the threat of an ever-widening conflict
transcending political boundaries of its origins. Yet the leadership differences between Ho Chi Minh and
Slobodan Milosevic--as well as sociocultural differences between Slavic-Serbs and Vietnamese--should
cause opponents of NATO policy to pause in their righteous indignation.
Too often, history is not used to inform policy but rather to consciously and/or unconsciously support
instincts, predilections, and outright decisions that have already become salient. This social
psychological phenomenon is not that different than selectively attending to positive information about
an expensive purchase while ignoring and discounting that purchase's negative features as well as the
positive features of other products/services that were not purchased. In Kosovo, as with other security
policy dilemmas, the history of history informing policies is largely tragic. Is this the only lesson learned?
(See Attempting to Learn from History: NATO, Anti-Drug Policies, and Intelligence Assets. (July 18, 1997).
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